Are All Types of Morality Compromised in Psychopathy by Glenn, Andrea et al.
Journal of Personality Disorders, 23(4), 384–398, 2009
 2009 The Guilford Press
ARE ALL TYPES OF MORALITY COMPROMISED
IN PSYCHOPATHY?
Andrea L. Glenn, MA, Ravi Iyer, MA, Jesse Graham, MA,
Spassena Koleva, MA, and Jonathan Haidt, PhD
A long-standing puzzle for moral philosophers and psychologists alike
is the concept of psychopathy, a personality disorder marked by tend-
encies to defy moral norms despite cognitive knowledge about right and
wrong. Previously, discussions of the moral deficits of psychopathy
have focused on willingness to harm and cheat others as well as reason-
ing about rule-based transgressions. Yet recent research in moral psy-
chology has begun to more clearly define the domains of morality, en-
compassing issues of harm, fairness, loyalty, authority, and spiritual
purity. Clinical descriptions and theories of psychopathy suggest that
deficits may exist primarily in the areas of harm and fairness, although
quantitative evidence is scarce. Within a broad sample of participants,
we found that scores on a measure of psychopathy predicted sharply
lower scores on the harm and fairness subscales of a measure of moral
concern, but showed no relationship with authority, and very small re-
lationships with ingroup and purity. On a measure of willingness to
violate moral standards for money, psychopathy scores predicted
greater willingness to violate moral concerns of any type. Results are
further explored via potential mediators and analyses of the two factors
of psychopathy.
Psychopathy is a clinical construct defined as a constellation of personal-
ity and behavioral features, including callousness; manipulativeness; a
lack of guilt, remorse, and empathy; impulsiveness; sensation-seeking;
and frequent antisocial and immoral behavior (Cleckley, 1976; Hare,
2003). Previous descriptions of the relationship between psychopathy and
morality have used general terms such as moral insanity and without
conscience (Hare, 1999; Pritchard, 1835), or have focused on a few aspects
of morality such as the willingness to harm and cheat others (e.g., Blair
et al., 2002; Levenston, Patrick, Bradley, & Lang, 2000) or the ability to
distinguish between moral and conventional transgressions. In a recent
review, Blair (2007) has suggested that psychopathy is primarily associ-
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ated with compromised care-based morality, or a lack of concern for the
well-being of others. He suggests that other types of morality (e.g., disgust-
based morality and reasoning about conventional transgressions) are
likely intact in psychopaths. Recent work in moral psychology (Haidt &
Graham, 2007) has begun to more clearly define the different types of mo-
rality that exist universally, allowing us to test this hypothesis in a single
study; these domains of human morality encompass concepts of harm,
fairness, group loyalty, respect for authority, and purity. These five “moral
foundations” represent our basic moral intuitions in the social world. This
study is the first to simultaneously explore whether psychopathy is associ-
ated with deficits in all of these distinct moral domains.
Several taxometric studies indicate that psychopathy is a dimensional
construct rather than a qualitatively distinct category of behavior (psycho-
path; Edens, Marcus, Lilienfeld, & Poythress, 2006; Hare, 2003). Given
the strength of the dimensional perspective, community studies on psy-
chopathy are increasing (Lilienfeld & Fowler, 2006). Findings from studies
of community samples often mirror those observed in forensic populations
(e.g., Benning, Patrick, & Iacono, 2005; Lynam, Whiteside, & Jones, 1999),
indicating that there are continuities between community and incarcer-
ated participants in the mechanisms underlying psychopathy. Thus, the
examination of individual variation in degree of psychopathic traits within
the general population can be beneficial in furthering our understanding
of psychopathy. By assessing individual variation in psychopathy in a
large sample, the present study aims to explore the relationship between
psychopathic traits and different types of morality.
Prior studies of the morality of psychopathy have focused on issues of
justice (Kohlberg, 1969) and the distinction between harmful and conven-
tional transgressions (Turiel, 1983). Several researchers in the justice-
focused Kohlbergian tradition have hypothesized that psychopathy may
represent a lower stage of moral development, but empirical results have
been mixed. In a study using Turiel’s moral-conventional task, Blair (1995)
found that incarcerated psychopaths do not distinguish between trans-
gressions that have harmful consequences for others, which he labels
moral transgressions, and conventional transgressions, which violate so-
cial norms or rules. Blair (2007) suggests that psychopaths may have defi-
cits specifically in moral judgments involving harm to others; they do not
appear to have difficulty in detecting or rating conventional transgres-
sions, which resemble authority-based morality, as conceived by Haidt
and Graham (2007). Furthermore results regarding disgust processing in
psychopaths, which may underlie disgust-based morality, have been
mixed (Blair, 2007). Blair (2007) suggests that the specificity of the moral
impairment to harm-based morality may result from dysfunction of key
brain regions, namely the amygdala and ventromedial prefrontal cortex.
The amygdala is thought to be involved in learning to associate one’s own
harmful actions with cues of a victim’s distress. Indeed, psychopaths dem-
onstrate reduced autonomic nervous system responding to cues of dis-
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tress in others (Aniskiewicz, 1979; Blair, 1999; Blair, Jones, Clark, &
Smith, 1997), a lack of startle responding when primed with victim scenes
(Levenston et al., 2000), and a failure to identify sad and fearful facial and
vocal cues (Blair, Colledge, Murray, & Mitchell, 2001; Blair et al., 2002),
all of which have been associated with amygdala impairment. The ventro-
medial prefrontal cortex is involved in representing reinforcement out-
comes, which when dysfunctional, may impair appropriate decision-making.
Blair suggests that reasoning about conventional transgressions or dis-
gust-based morality likely involve regions such as the insula and ventro-
lateral prefrontal cortex, which have not generally been found to be im-
paired in psychopathic individuals. In the current study, we seek to test
the hypothesis put forth by Blair (2007) that psychopathy is primarily as-
sociated with impaired harm-based moral reasoning.
Haidt and Graham (2007) have proposed that morality can be under-
stood in terms of five underlying psychological systems, or moral founda-
tions. These five foundations are:
(1) Harm/care—representing concerns about violence and the suffering
of others, including compassion and care;
(2) Fairness/reciprocity—representing the norms of reciprocal relations,
equality, rights and justice;
(3) Ingroup/loyalty—covering moral obligations related to group mem-
bership, such as loyalty, betrayal, and expectations of preferential treat-
ment for ingroup members relative to outgroup members;
(4) Authority/respect—representing moral obligations related to hierar-
chical relations, such as obedience, duty, respect for superiors, and pro-
tection of subordinates;
(5) Purity/sanctity—representing the moral ideal of living in an elevated,
noble, and less carnal way, based on intuitions about divinity, feelings of
moral disgust, and purity of body, mind and soul.
Several large empirical investigations with diverse samples have sup-
ported the existence of these five distinct moral foundations (Graham,
Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Graham, Nosek, & Haidt, 2009; Haidt & Graham,
2007). A variety of methods and measures have been used to gauge foun-
dation-related concerns, and confirmatory factor analysis models of the
different measures have shown that five-factor models improve upon one-,
two-, and three-factor models, weighing both fit and parsimony (see sup-
plement to Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009, and Graham, Nosek, Haidt,
Iyer, et al., 2009).
The first goal of the present study was to assess the relationships be-
tween psychopathic traits and each of these foundations of morality. While
the evidence is quite strong that psychopathic individuals exhibit reduced
concern about harming others (Blair et al., 2002; Levenston et al., 2000),
less is known about the relationship between psychopathy and the other
foundations of morality. Cleckley’s (1976) portraits of psychopaths who
betray their families, lovers, and bosses, and who have loose or no sexual
morals, seems to suggest that we might find a reduction in concerns about
Ingroup, Authority, and Purity as well as Harm and Fairness. However,
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Blair (1995) has found evidence of intact rule- or authority-based moral
reasoning and evidence regarding disgust processing in psychopaths has
been mixed.
Two main questionnaires were used to assess these relationships. The
Moral Foundations Questionnaire (Graham, Nosek, Haidt, Iyer, et al.,
2009) uses abstract relevance assessments and more contextualized moral
judgments to measure individual reliance on each of the foundations. The
Moral Foundations Sacredness Scale (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009) as-
sesses how “sacred” individuals find each of the domains by asking how
much money it would take for them to commit an act that violates princi-
ples of the domain.
A second goal of the study was to explore potential mediators of relation-
ships between psychopathy and the moral foundations. A measure of em-
pathy was included based on the hypothesis that individual differences in
empathy may mediate any observed relationships between psychopathy
and the Harm and Fairness foundations. Similarly, a measure of Social
Dominance Orientation was included to test whether individuals’ views on
social hierarchy mediate relations between psychopathy and the Ingroup
and Authority foundations. A measure of disgust sensitivity was included
as a possible mediator of the Purity foundation. Finally, the Ethics Position
Questionnaire was included as a supplementary measure to assess the
general flexibility/rigidity of individuals’ moral beliefs.
A final goal was to assess the role of two separate dimensions of psy-
chopathy in the relationship between this construct and the moral founda-
tions. Psychopathy has traditionally been conceptualized as having two
factors (Hare, 1991), with Factor 1 including the personality and emotional
features, and Factor 2 including the antisocial lifestyle/behavioral fea-
tures. A central aim was to assess the relative contribution of each of these
factors in predicting the five foundations of morality.
METHOD
PARTICIPANTS
Participants were 2,517 adult volunteers (39.1% female, median age 35
years) on the yourmorals.org website who completed the Levenson Psy-
chopathy Scale. Participants had previously registered on the site (report-
ing demographic information including age, sex, education, and a seven-
point liberal-conservative measure of political identity) and self-selected to
take one or more surveys based on the descriptions provided. Of the 2,517
participants who completed the Psychopathy Scale, 2,172 completed the
Moral Foundations Questionnaire, 1,252 completed the Moral Founda-
tions Sacredness Scale, 648 completed the Interpersonal Reactivity Index,
462 completed the Social Dominance Orientation Questionnaire, 1,343
completed the Disgust Scale, and 593 completed the Ethics Position Ques-
tionnaire.
388 GLENN ET AL.
MATERIALS
Levenson’s Self-Report Psychopathy Scale (LSRP). Psychopathy was as-
sessed using the LSRP (Levenson, Kiehl, & Fitzpatrick, 1995). The LSRP is
a 26-item rating scale with two factors that were constructed to provide
indices of the two factors of the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R;
Hare, 1991), a semi-structured interview which is considered the gold
standard for assessing psychopathy in forensic samples. Exploratory fac-
tory analysis revealed a two-factor structure that in fact mirrors the two
factors of the PCL-R (Levenson et al., 1995). The Factor 1 subscale as-
sesses the core personality traits of psychopathy, including manipulative-
ness, callousness, and lack of guilt or remorse; the Factor 2 subscale as-
sesses features of the antisocial lifestyle, including impulsiveness,
irresponsibility, and antisocial behavior. Items are rated on a 4-point Lik-
ert-type agree/disagree scale. The LSRP and its factor structure was ini-
tially validated in a sample of 487 undergraduates (Levenson et al., 1995)
and was further validated by Lynam et al. (1999) in two studies of commu-
nity participants. These two studies provided excellent evidence for the
reliability and validity of the LSRP and strongly replicated the two-factor
structure using confirmatory factor analyses and differential relations to
personality dimensions. Predicted relations were observed between the
LSRP and other self-report measures of delinquency and individuals scor-
ing higher on the LSRP demonstrated task-related deficits similar to those
observed in incarcerated psychopaths. A recent taxometric analysis of the
LSRP found it to support the dimensional interpretation of psychopathy,
consistent with findings on the PCL-R and other self-report measures
(Walters, Brinkley, Magaletta, & Diamond, 2008).
Moral Foundations Questionnaire. This scale consists of two 15-item
parts. First, participants rated the moral relevance of foundation-specific
concerns to their moral judgments using a 6-point scale anchored by “not
at all relevant” and “extremely relevant” (e.g., When you decide whether
something is right or wrong, to what extent do you consider whether or
not someone was harmed?). In the second part, they indicated their agree-
ment (on a 6-point agree/disagree scale) with more specific and contextu-
alized moral statements such as “Loyalty to one’s group is more important
than one’s individual concerns” (Ingroup) or “I would call some acts wrong
on the grounds that they are unnatural” (Purity). Items and validity infor-
mation about this scale can be found in Graham, Nosek, Haidt, Iyer, et al.
(2009). Foundation means and reliabilities are shown in Table 1.
Moral Foundations Sacredness Scale. This 26-item scale indirectly mea-
sures how much an individual values each foundation of morality by ask-
ing how much money it would take to commit actions that violate each
of the foundations, assuming no punishment or negative consequences.
Participants rated a variety of behaviors that violate the moral foundations
according to the following options: $0 (I’d do it for free), $10, $100, $1,000,
$10,000, $100,000, A million dollars, or Never for any amount of money.
Sample behaviors included “Get a blood transfusion of one pint of disease-
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TABLE 1. Descriptive Statistics for Study Measures and Subsamples
N Min Max Mean (SD) Coefficient !
Psychopathy 2,517 26 94 46.17 (10.53) .870
Factor 1 2,517 16 62 26.60 (7.54) .868
Factor 2 2,517 10 38 19.57 (4.92) .716
Morality Foundations
Harm 2,172 0 5.00 3.58 (.83) .744
Fairness 2,172 0 5.00 3.53 (.72) .702
Ingroup 2,172 0 4.88 2.14 (.89) .760
Authority 2,172 0 4.88 2.29 (.90) .750
Purity 2,172 0 5.00 1.81 (1.11) .851
Interpersonal Reactivity Index
Perspective Taking 648 1.14 5.00 3.68 (.75) .726
Fantasy 648 1.14 5.00 3.72 (.82) .717
Empathic Concern 648 1.00 5.00 3.70 (.79) .690
Personal Distress 648 1.00 4.86 2.31 (.79) .750
Social Dominance Orientation 462 1.00 6.63 2.50 (1.15) .914
Disgust Scale
Core Disgust 1,343 0 3.92 1.96 (.70) .773
Animal Reminder 1,343 0 4.00 1.60 (.82) .788
Contamination 1,343 0 3.80 1.20 (.76) .559
Total 1,343 0 3.80 1.69 (.63) .864
Sacredness Scale
Harm 1,252 1.60 8.00 6.14 (1.23) .669
Fairness 1,252 1.00 8.00 6.66 (1.20) .704
Ingroup 1,252 1.00 8.00 5.18 (1.42) .692
Authority 1,252 1.00 8.00 4.15 (1.59) .680
Purity 1,252 1.00 8.00 5.77 (1.37) .587
Ethics Positions Questionnaire
Idealism 593 1.00 7.78 3.21 (.96) .896
Relativism 593 1.00 8.70 3.17 (1.18) .910
free, compatible blood from a convicted child molester” (Purity violation)
or “Burn your country’s flag in private” (nobody else sees you; Ingroup
violation). The more sacred a value is to an individual, the more money it
would take to betray that value. Items for each foundation are averaged
to yield a single sacredness score for that foundation. Items and validity
information for this scale can be found in Graham, Haidt, and Nosek
(2009), Study 3.
Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Empathy). This 28-item measure was
used to measure individual differences in empathy (Davis, 1983). The scale
covers four aspects of empathic responding: (1) Perspective-taking, or the
tendency to adopt the psychological viewpoint of others, (2) Fantasy, or the
tendency to transpose oneself imaginatively into the feelings and actions of
fictitious characters in books, movies, and plays, (3) Empathic Concern, or
feelings of sympathy and concern for unfortunate others, and (4) Personal
Distress, or feelings of personal anxiety and unease in tense interpersonal
settings.
Social Dominance Orientation Questionnaire. This 16-item questionnaire
(Sidanius & Pratto, 2001) was used to measure individual differences in
group-based discrimination and domination, or a preference for social hi-
erarchy versus equality in society (e.g., It’s okay if some groups have more
of a chance in life than others). This personality variable is also associated
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with a preference for aggression or meanness, punishment of low-status
group members, and dominance of high-status groups (men, whites, up-
per classes, etc.).
Disgust Scale-Revised. This 25-item scale (Haidt, McCauley, & Rozin,
1994; revised by Olatunji et al., 2007) was included to determine whether
individual differences in sensitivity to disgust would mediate the potential
relationship between psychopathy and the Purity foundation. Three sub-
scales include: (1) Core disgust: the core of the emotion, which is about
defending the mouth from contamination by dirty or inappropriate things
like body excretions, vermin, and certain combinations of foods (e.g., It
bothers me to hear someone clear a throat full of mucus), (2) Animal-
reminder disgust: things involving death, corpses, and violations of exter-
nal boundaries of the body, such as amputations (e.g., It would bother me
to be in a science class and to see a human hand preserved in a jar), and
(3) Contamination disgust: defense of the whole body, not just the mouth,
from contact with dirty or sleazy people (e.g., I never let any part of my
body touch the toilet seat in public restrooms).
Ethics Positions Questionnaire. This 20-item questionnaire (Forsyth,
1980) was used to measure how people determine what is moral or im-
moral along two dimensions, idealism, and relativism. Idealism measures
how willing a person is to consider committing an immoral act in the ser-
vice of a greater good (e.g., A person should make certain that their actions
never intentionally harm another even to a small degree). Relativism mea-
sures how much one subscribes to the idea that morality can vary depend-
ing upon situation and culture (e.g., There are no ethical principles that
are so important that they should be a part of any code of ethics). This
scale was included as a general assessment of rigidity of moral beliefs.
RESULTS
Means, standard deviations, and reliabilities of each scale are provided in
Table 1. Mean psychopathy scores did not differ between the subsamples
that completed each of the other scales. Coefficient alphas for the psy-
chopathy scale were .859 (total), .868 (Factor 1), and .716 (Factor 2); the
correlation between the two factors was .401.
Multiple regression was used to examine how well psychopathy scores
predicted endorsement and sacredness of the five foundations (Table 2),
as well as scores on the additional scales used to assess potential media-
tors and to provide supplementary information. Age, sex, education, and
political identity were included as covariates in all regression analyses.
Regressions were first conducted using total psychopathy scores. Because
scores for the two psychopathy factors are highly correlated (r = .401, p <
.001), an additional set of regressions included both Factor 1 and Factor
2 of psychopathy to examine the relationship of each factor to the morality
foundations while controlling for the other factor and demographic covari-
ates.
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TABLE 2. Regression Analyses Predicting Study Measures
from Psychopathy
Total Factor 1 Factor 2
Morality Foundations (n = 2,172)
Harm −.205*** −.288*** .069
Fairness −.158*** −.214*** .044
Ingroup .122*** .099*** .045
Authority .018 .021 −.001
Purity −.084** −.126*** .038
Interpersonal Reactivity Index (n = 648)
Perspective Taking −.333*** −.177*** −.240***
Fantasy −.011 −.084 .083
Empathic Concern −.351*** −.419*** .021
Personal Distress .038 −.045 .039
Social Dominance Orientation (n = 462) .351*** .457*** −.087
Disgust Scale (n = 1,343)
Core Disgust −.002 −.110* .132**
Animal Reminder −.012 −.086 .089
Contamination .014 −.023 .047
Total −.003 −.101* .120**
Sacredness Scale (n = 1,252)
Harm −.333*** −.375*** .003
Fairness −.438*** −.449*** −.048
Ingroup −.252*** −.194*** −.105***
Authority −.286*** −.207*** −.134***
Purity −.105*** −.125*** .009
Ethics Position Questionnaire (n = 593)
Idealism −.211*** −.290*** .062
Relativism .214*** .202*** .046
Note. Summary of estimates from multiple regression models predicting
moral foundations and other study variables from psychopathy scores, age,
sex, education, and political views. Numbers indicate standardized beta (β).
Beta values in the left column are from multiple regressions including total
psychopathy scores; values in the right two columns are from multiple re-
gressions including both Factor 1 and Factor 2 psychopathy scores. Nega-
tive β indicates lower scale ratings for individuals higher in psychopathy.
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001
MORAL FOUNDATIONS QUESTIONNAIRE.
Total psychopathy scores most strongly predicted lower endorsement of
the moral foundations of Harm and Fairness (Table 2). Of the two factors
underlying psychopathy, Factor 1, which represents the affective and in-
terpersonal features, was a stronger predictor than Factor 2. Psychopathy
also predicted higher endorsement of the Ingroup foundation, in which
Factor 1 was again a stronger predictor. Psychopathy was not a significant
predictor of endorsement of the Authority foundations and demonstrated
a weak negative relationship with the Purity foundation. Figure 1 (left) de-
picts the average foundation ratings across psychopathy scores.
Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Empathy). Regression results (Table 2) in-
dicated that higher psychopathy scores were highly predictive of low
scores on the Perspective Taking and Empathic Concern subscales of the
Interpersonal Reactivity Index. These subscales were also positively corre-
lated with the Harm (Empathic Concern: r = .557, p < .001; Perspective
Taking: r = .234, p < .001) and Fairness foundations (Empathic Concern:
392 GLENN ET AL.
FIGURE 1. Endorsement (Moral Foundations Questionnaire) and sacredness (Sacredness
Scale) of moral foundations across psychopathy scores. (Left) Psychopathy is primarily asso-
ciated with reduced considerations of Harm and Fairness when making moral judgments.
(Right) In all domains of morality, individuals scoring higher in psychopathy report that they
would be willing to accept a lesser amount of money to commit an act violating moral princi-
ples. The range of psychopathy scores is divided into ten equal bins; data points represent
the average of foundation scores for subjects within each bin.
r = .446, p < .001; Perspective Taking: r = .166, p < .001), indicating that
they may serve as potential mediators of the relationship between psy-
chopathy and the Harm and Fairness foundations (Baron & Kenny, 1986).
We tested the significance of Perspective Taking and Empathic Concern as
potential mediators of this relationship (Sobel, 1982). Results revealed
that Empathic Concern, but not Perspective Taking, mediated the relation-
ship between psychopathy and the foundations of Harm (Sobel test statis-
tic = −13.98, p < .001) such that higher psychopathy scores predicted
lower Emphatic Concern scores, which in turn predicted lower endorse-
ment of the Harm foundation. A similar mediation was found for the Fair-
ness foundation (Sobel test statistic = −7.73, p < .001). Figure 2(a) pre-
sents parameter estimates for both mediation models.
Social Dominance Orientation. The Social Dominance Orientation (SDO)
scale was used to further explore the relationship between psychopathy
and the Ingroup foundation (no relationship was found between Authority
and psychopathy, so Authority was not included). Psychopathy was posi-
tively correlated with SDO (r = .372, p < .001) and SDO was positively corre-
lated with the Ingroup foundation (r = .289, p < .001), making SDO a poten-
tial mediator of the relationship between psychopathy and the Ingroup
foundation. A test of mediation revealed that SDO mediated the relationship
between psychopathy and the Ingroup foundation (Sobel test statistic =
4.89, p < .001). Parameter estimates for the mediation model are pre-
sented in Figure 2(b).
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FIGURE 2. Results of mediation models. (a) Empathic Concern mediates the relationship
between psychopathy and the foundations of Harm and Fairness. (b) Social Dominance Ori-
entation mediates the relationship between psychopathy and the Ingroup foundation. In each
model, the coefficients in parentheses represent the zero-order correlations between two vari-
ables, and the coefficients without parentheses represent the standardized regression coeffi-
cients (β) from a simple linear regression model containing psychopathy and the mediator
variable as predictors. *p < .01 and **p < .001.
Disgust Scale. As reported above, psychopathy scores weakly predicted
reduced endorsement of the Purity foundation. However, psychopathy was
not a significant predictor of scores on the Disgust Scale or any of its sub-
scales.
Sacredness Scale. Although psychopathy was primarily associated with
reduced endorsement of Harm and Fairness foundations on the Moral
Foundations Questionnaire, results of the Sacredness Scale showed that
higher psychopathy predicted greater willingness to accept money to vio-
late a moral principle on all five foundations (Table 2). Figure 1 (right)
demonstrates the decrease in monetary amount ratings with increasing
psychopathy scores. Factor 1 contributed relatively more variance in all
foundations.
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Ethics Positions Questionnaire: Idealism versus Relativism. Psychopathy
predicted less idealism and more relativism when determining what is
moral (Table 2). In other words, more psychopathic individuals indicated
they were more willing to violate moral principles in certain situations
(e.g., to serve the greater good), and subscribed to the idea that morality
can vary in different situations. Factor 1 accounted for more variance on
both scales.
DISCUSSION
The present results suggest that the moral deficits observed in psychopa-
thy are primarily concentrated in two domains—Harm and Fairness.
When controlling for age, sex, education level, and politics, individuals
scoring higher in psychopathy were significantly less likely to consider
moral principles related to Harm and Fairness when making moral judg-
ments in their daily lives. It was hypothesized that this finding may be
due to deficits in psychopathic individuals’ ability to experience certain
elements of empathy, namely the ability to feel sympathy and concern for
unfortunate others (Empathic Concern) and the ability to adopt the psy-
chological perspective of others (Perspective Taking). Empathic Concern,
but not Perspective Taking, was found to mediate the relationship between
psychopathy and the Harm and Fairness foundations. This suggests that
although psychopathy is associated with both Perspective Taking and Em-
pathic Concern, reduced Empathic Concern may be primarily responsible
for differences in moral judgments that involve considering whether others
will be harmed or treated unfairly. Individuals lacking strong feelings of
empathy may not find the wellbeing of others to be a salient concern, and
thus may not be deterred from engaging in immoral behavior that causes
harm to or exploits others. This result lends support for Blair’s (2007) the-
ory that psychopathic individuals may have impairments in learning to
care about the welfare of others. The specificity of the deficits to the do-
mains of Harm and Fairness may result from dysfunction of the amygdala
and ventromedial prefrontal cortex, which are important in decision-making
that involves concern for distress in others (Blair, 2007).
Individuals scoring higher in psychopathy demonstrated a small in-
crease in endorsement of the Ingroup foundation, which involves concerns
about loyalty and betrayal among ingroup members, and can also involve
a lack of concern about outgroup members. More psychopathic individu-
als may exhibit increased endorsement of the Ingroup foundation for sev-
eral reasons—they may exhibit more hostility toward members of other
groups, less concern for members of other groups, or less tolerance for
individuals who betray their own group. Consequently, they may prefer
hierarchies among groups, especially as it allows their ingroup to domi-
nate other groups. Psychopathy was indeed found to be highly associated
with social dominance orientation, which was found to mediate the rela-
tionship between psychopathy and the Ingroup foundation. This suggests
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that ideas related to social dominance may disproportionately impact
moral judgments regarding group dynamics in psychopathic individuals.
Furthermore, they may be more likely to engage in behavior that reinforces
social hierarchies, including using other groups to get ahead in life.
No relationship was observed between psychopathy and endorsement of
the Authority foundation and only a weak relationship was observed with
the Purity foundation, suggesting that when making moral decisions psy-
chopathic individuals implement principles of these foundations at about
the same rates as nonpsychopathic individuals. This is consistent with
previous research involving conventional transgressions, in which psycho-
pathic individuals did not demonstrate impairment in appropriately rating
rule-based transgressions (Blair, 1995). There was also no relationship ob-
served between the disgust and psychopathy. Some previous studies have
found evidence of reduced experience of disgust in psychopaths (Forth,
1992; Kosson, Suchy, Mayer, & Libby, 2002; Levenston et al., 2000)
whereas others have not (Blair et al., 2001; Dolan & Fullam, 2006). Fur-
ther research is needed to clarify the relationship between psychopathy
and disgust.
Interestingly, although psychopathy was primarily associated with low
endorsement of the Harm and Fairness foundations, when an option of
monetary reward was present, more psychopathic individuals indicated
that they would accept a lesser amount of money to violate a moral princi-
ple regardless of the domain. This suggests that psychopathic individuals
are more willing to disregard moral principles of any type for a nonmoral
incentive such as money. This finding supports the idea that the impaired
decision-making of psychopathic individuals may be partly a result of a
motivational imbalance that involves enhanced sensitivity to reward (i.e.,
money) and reduced sensitivity to punishment (i.e., consequences of com-
mitting immoral acts; van Honk & Schutter, 2006). Previous studies exam-
ining reward- and punishment-based responding in psychopaths have
found that they have particular difficulty inhibiting punishable responses
in conditions involving an alternative reward (Newman, 1998), and that
psychopaths’ behavioral disinhibition is most evident when there is a re-
ward contingency for responding (Hiatt & Newman, 2006). This is the first
study to demonstrate how such effects may impact moral decision-making.
It appears that for more psychopathic individuals, the rewarding aspect of
receiving money outweighs the negative effects (e.g., emotions of guilt or
remorse) associated with committing an immoral act. This finding is sup-
ported by results from the Ethics Position Questionnaire which suggest
that more psychopathic individuals are generally less rigid in their beliefs
about morality and are more willing to commit an immoral act in the face
of competing alternatives.
Finally, the examination of the relative contributions of each psychopa-
thy factor to the moral foundations revealed that Factor 1 was more
strongly related to endorsement and sacredness of the Harm and Fairness
foundations. Factor 1 describes many of the interpersonal and affective
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features of psychopathy, including a lack of empathy, that are likely im-
portant in making judgments about how others are treated. Factor 2 ac-
counted for part of the variance in the sacredness of the Ingroup and Au-
thority foundations, but not to the general endorsement of the foundations.
This suggests that, at least for these two foundations, when an external
reward comes into play, Factor 2 features of psychopathy begin to have
more of an impact on moral judgment. Interestingly, Factor 2 features,
such as impulsivity, irresponsibility, and stimulation seeking, appear to be
more reward-based. It may be the case that individuals higher on Factor 2
are more motivated by the rewarding aspect of receiving money.
A primary limitation of the current study is the reliance on self-report
data to assess psychopathy. Psychopathy can be a particularly difficult
construct to measure because psychopaths are frequently dishonest. This
is an issue that is problematic for both self-report and interview-based
assessments. Online self-report measures have the advantage of being
anonymous, but lack the insight that can be gained from lengthy inter-
views. Interview-based methods may suffer from the social pressure to
please the interviewer, though this can be improved by including supple-
mentary records. In the present study, the primary advantage of using a
self-report measure was the ability to assess a very large sample of individ-
uals. This allowed us to obtain a wide range of psychopathy scores from a
community sample. As noted in the methods, the self-report measure used
in the present study has been validated in large, community samples and
factor analyses have indicated that the two factors obtained in the current
sample mirror the two factors of the PCL-R, which is considered the gold-
standard interview-based method for assessing psychopathy. Perhaps
most important is the evidence that individuals scoring higher on the
LSRP have demonstrated task-related deficits similar to those observed in
incarcerated psychopaths. However, results of the present study should be
extended in future studies with a more objective measure of psychopathy.
Taken together, results from the present study indicate that even within
nonincarcerated populations, individual differences in psychopathic per-
sonality impact how moral judgments are made. Higher psychopathy
scores predict a willingness to disregard moral guidelines primarily when
they pertain to harm and fairness, indicating reduced consideration for
how others are treated when making moral decisions. As hypothesized by
Blair (2007), lack of empathic concern plays a key role in this process. In
the presence of reward, psychopathy predicts a willingness to disregard
moral guidelines in all domains, suggesting that rewards may be more sa-
lient than the negative emotions associated with committing immoral acts.
The finding that alternative rewards play a significant role in moral deci-
sion-making of psychopathic individuals may have implications for the
criminal justice system, which currently uses punishment rather than re-
ward-based techniques for deterring individuals from committing immoral
acts.
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